为了降低银行的资本风险，巴塞尔协议III在原有资本充足率监管的基础上引入了杠杆率监管，中国银监会也相应地出台了商业银行杠杆率监管办法。现有文献主要是从商业银行行为的角度出发探讨杠杆率监管对银行风险和金融系统稳定性的影响。本文则从企业行为的角度出发，研究银行杠杆率监管对企业短债长用行为的影响。在一个动态博弈理论模型的框架下，本文考察了杠杆率监管如何改变企业的融资成本和债务期限，并发现杠杆率监管会降低企业的短期债务比例，减少短债长用的问题，进而降低提前清算风险并提升社会福利。进一步的分析还发现，杠杆率监管减少企业短债长用的政策效果在经济景气时期更为显著。这意味着杠杆率监管对于企业的影响具有逆周期特性。在一般均衡的框架下，本文的主要结果依然成立，且效应得到加强。

We investigate how exposure to the One-Child Policy (OCP) during early adulthood affects marriage and fertility in China. Exploring fertility penalties across provinces over time and the different implementations by ethnicity, we show that the OCP significantly increases the unmarried rate among the Han ethnicity but not among the minorities. The OCP increases Han-minority marriages in regions where Han-minority couples are allowed for an additional child, but the impact is smaller in other regions. Finally, the deadweight loss caused by lower fertility accounts for 10 percent of annual household incomes, and policy-induced fewer marriages contribute to 30 percent of the fertility decline.