Mega-events such as the Olympic Games, the World Cup, the World Expos, and the G20 Summit play important roles in international political economy in the age of globalization. But we know little about how they shape domestic politics and policy processes in their host countries. China has emerged as the leading host of various sports, cultural, economic, and political mega-events in the past decades. Employing an original panel dataset of Chinese cities from 2001 to 2019, we find that cities that host mega-events gain an advantage in bargaining with central bureaucracies for policy resources. Using subway investments as an example, we demonstrate that host cities not only obtained centrally regulated infrastructure investments that directly serve the needs of the events, but also achieve development that they otherwise could not. The result is robust with two-way fixed effects models and after accounting for various alternative explanations. We show that host cities gain advantage because the events capture the attention of national leaders. National leaders have power over central bureaucrats’ careers and thus steer their decisions, and they see the success of mega-events as an opportunity to project national strengths. Our findings highlight the domestic policy consequences of international events in the age of China’s rapid rise and integration with the world.

公民是否主动遵守公共政策对国家治理具有重要意义。国家如何以较小代价获得公民在日常社会治理政策领域的政策遵从？从激励与压力两个维度出发，可将公民遵守日常社会政策的行为划分为“不服从”“价值认同服从”“强制性服从”与“社会规范性服从”四种类型。在城市垃圾分类新规实施后，对北京市城镇居民履行垃圾分类义务的问卷调查发现：价值认同与社会规范是实现公民政策服从的关键因素，并且二者发挥了同样重要的影响。相比之下，因当前法规惩戒性有限，强制性服从尚未成为影响公民履行垃圾分类义务的关键因素。本文的发现对在社会治理领域运用“助推型”政策干预策略具有借鉴意义。

形式主义官僚主义是基层治理中政策执行变形的重要表现形式。然而，学界对基层治理中形式主义官僚主义现象成因的理论探索尚显薄弱。本文首先梳理了不同历史时期对形式主义官僚主义现象的界定，从变化的表现和定义中提炼抽象共性。在此基础上，本文从大型科层制组织内部层级关系和激励结构视角出发，提炼了影响基层官员行为的两个维度，即考核指标清晰化程度和激励方向。我们将这两个维度影响下的基层官员行为分为“不执行”“表演式执行”“过度执行”和积极执行四类，其中前三类都属于政策执行变形。在这一分析框架下，我们阐述了导致基层官员在政策执行过程中选择“不执行”“表演式执行”或“过度执行”的因素。设置合理的激励结构对于破除基层形式主义官僚主义、防止政策执行变形、实现国家治理现代化具有重要意义。