【主讲人】魏旭 教授
【主持人】高明 长聘副教授
【报告题目】The Effects of Frequent Disclosure on Price Informativeness and Cost of Capital in a Keynesian Beauty Contest Setting

【报告摘要】We study the effects of more frequent public disclosure in a two-period rational expectations equilibrium model with short-term investors, thus featuring Keynesian beauty contest. We find that including public disclosure in every period generates substantially different results on how disclosure affects price informativeness and cost of capital, compared with the previous literature in the absence of public disclosure after trading. Specifically, the introduction of future-period public information can both increase price informativeness of the previous period through alleviating the beauty contest effect and decrease price informativeness through crowding out the informativeness of future disclosure. We find that more frequent disclosure unambiguously increases informativeness of all prices, in contrast to the independence result documented in the previous literature. In addition, more frequent disclosure has a more subtle effect on ex-ante cost of capital, again in contrast to the independence result documented previously. Our results provide novel empirical and regulatory implications.

【主讲人介绍】魏旭现任中央财经大学金融学院教授，龙马青年学者。他于北京大学取得金融学博士学位，研究领域包括金融监管理论、公司金融理论、应用微观理论等。在《经济研究》《经济学（季刊）》《管理科学学报》和Journal of Banking & Finance、Journal of Financial Markets、Journal of Environmental Economics & Management等国内外期刊发表论文数篇，主持国家自然科学基金课题两项。