【主讲人】张鹏飞 副教授
【主持人】高明 长聘副教授
【报告题目】Network Centralization and Corporate Fraud

【报告摘要】This paper uses the market entity registration data to construct a longitudinal membership network for the corporate group corresponding to each unique listed firm in China from 2004 through 2021. We formulate and test a theoretical hypothesis that predicts the relationship between network centralization and corporate fraud. Network centralization reflects the extent of power concentration within a corporate group. We find that network centralization is positively related to fraud commission and negatively related to fraud detection. Bivariate probit model estimates show that a corporate group has a 9.1% higher likelihood of fraud commission and a 6.9% lower likelihood of detection conditional on committing fraud when its network centralization increases one standard deviation. We test two potential channels through which power concentration affects corporate fraud: coercive power and concealing information. Our results suggest that power structure significantly affects corporate governance.

【主讲人介绍】张鹏飞现任北京大学经济学院副教授，资源、环境与产业经济学系系主任。研究领域是发展经济学和政治经济学，论文发表于Journal of Economics, Journal of Comparative Economics,《经济研究》和《经济学（季刊）》等刊物，曾担任Journal of Economic Theory, International Economic Review,《中国社会科学》和《经济学（季刊）》等刊物的匿名审稿人。