<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?><xml><records><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>17</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Wei Xu</style></author><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Yongwei Chen</style></author><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Mohan Zhou</style></author><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Yi Zhou</style></author></authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">SOE preference and credit misallocation: A model and some evidence from China</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Economics Letters</style></secondary-title></titles><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2016</style></year></dates><urls><web-urls><url><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/abs/pii/S0165176515004796</style></url></web-urls></urls><volume><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">138</style></volume><pages><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">38-41</style></pages><language><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">eng</style></language><abstract><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">We endogenize credit misallocation by introducing the government’s preference. The local government determines the credit subsidy to SOEs after a trade-off between SOEs’ profits and local aggregate outputs. Credit misallocation is more severe in regions where SOE share is high.</style></abstract></record></records></xml>