@article {23745,
	title = {From Scepticism to Nihilism: A Nihilistic Interpretation of N{\={a}}g{\={a}}rjuna{\textquoteright}s Refutations},
	journal = {Journal of Indian Philosophy},
	volume = {47},
	year = {2019},
	pages = {749-777},
	abstract = {On the basis of N{\={a}}g{\={a}}rjuna{\textquoteright}s works, especially the Mulamadhyamakak{\={a}}rik{\={a}}, this paper proposes a sceptic presupposition as the departure point of N{\={a}}g{\={a}}rjuna{\textquoteright}s refutations. This presupposition invalidates perceptual knowledge, and thus the identities of existents (svabh{\={a}}va) can only be deemed as referents assumed by concepts (n{\={a}}man, vikalpa, etc.). Then the {\textquotedblleft}confinement principle,{\textquotedblright} a theorem tacitly applied in N{\={a}}g{\={a}}rjuna{\textquoteright}s arguments, is justified, i.e., any definition or description of a concept would necessarily confine its assumed referent to an invariable and isolated state. This principle enables N{\={a}}g{\={a}}rjuna to deduce contradictions between the static and isolated nature of the assumed referent, and the activity in which it must be involved. Notions of both a static identity and its activity are deep-rooted in all referential mental activities of sentient beings. Hence all concepts are found to be self-contradictory and therefore devoid of referents (niḥsvabh{\={a}}va), namely, empty ({\'s}unya). Thus, N{\={a}}g{\={a}}rjuna is refuting the whole intelligible world, and his position can be identified as epistemological nihilism{\textemdash}nothing within our ken can possibly be},
	url = {https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s10781-019-09410-4},
	author = {Shaoyong Ye}
}
