【主讲人】 向昊天 助理教授
【主持人】 高明 助理教授

【报告摘要】Financial covenants influence firm behavior by state-contingently allocating decision rights. I develop a model with long-term debt where shareholders cannot commit to not dilute creditors in the future with new debt issuances and risky investments. Creditors intervene upon covenant violations and restructure the debt without ex ante commitment. My quantitative analysis suggests that financial covenants significantly increase debt capacity, investment and firm value by disciplining shareholders. Nonetheless, I show that lenders' inability to commit to a restructuring plan severely impairs contractual efficiency. Relative to the calibrated benchmark, adopting tighter covenants generates a further gain, although its magnitude might be small.

【主讲人介绍】Haotian Xiang (向昊天) is an Assistant Professor of Finance at Guanghua School of Management, Peking University. He received his B.A. in Finance from Guanghua School of Management in 2014 and his Ph.D. in Finance from the Wharton School, University of Pennsylvania in 2019. He conducts research at the intersection of corporate finance and macroeconomics. His research has been awarded 2019 WFA Cubist Systematic Strategies Ph.D. Award and 2018 Irvine Friend Finance Fellowship.